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Abstract. According to Probability 1 Infallibilism (henceforth, Infallibilism), if one knows that p, then 
the probability of p given one’s evidence is 1. Jessica Brown (2018, 2013) has recently argued that 
Infallibilism leads to scepticism unless the infallibilist also endorses the claim that if one knows that p, 
then p is part of one’s evidence for p. By doing that, however, the infalliblist has to explain why it is 
infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself. And yet, the infallibilist doesn’t seem to have a satisfying 
explanation available. Call this the Infelicity Challenge for Probability 1 Infallibilism. By exploiting the 
distinction between the justifying and the motivating role of evidence, in this paper, I argue that, contrary 
to first appearances, the Infelicity Challenge doesn’t arise for Probability 1 Infallibilism. However, after 
anticipating and resisting two objections to my argument, I show that we can identify a different version 
of infallibilism which seems to face a problem that is even more serious than the Infelicity Challenge. 




1. INFALLIBILISM AND THE INFELICITY CHALLENGE 
Infallibilism about knowledge has a bad reputation, for it’s often thought to easily lead to scepticism. In 
a nutshell, the worry seems to be that infallibilism sets standards for knowledge that are too high to be 
realistically achieved. There are many ways to define infallibilism. However, given its relevance in the 
                                                          
1 I presented parts of this paper at the Book Symposium on Jessica Brown’s Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, at the University 
of Glasgow, organised by the Cogito Epistemology Research Group, and at the Online Workshop on Recent Work on 
Scepticism (New Mexico State University/Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam). I would like to thank the attendants to those events 
and, in particular, Jessica Brown for giving a response to my talk at the Symposium. I am also grateful to Jaakko Hirvelä, Maria 
Lasonen-Aarnio, Aidan McGlynn, Niall Paterson, Martin Smith, and Silvan Wittwer for comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Finally, I would like to thank two anonymous referees for providing me with useful feedback on this paper. The work 
for this paper was supported by the European Research Council (European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
program, 758539); and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (“Varieties of Risk”, AH/T002638/1). 
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contemporary debate, for the purpose of this paper, I will focus my attention on the following version 
of infallibilism, called Probability 1 Infallibilism:2 
Probability 1 Infallibilism (P1I): If one knows that p, then the probability of p given one’s total evidence 
E is 1. 
 
The most recent attack to Probability 1 Infallibilism comes from Jessica Brown (2018, 2013). 3 The reason 
why Brown focuses on Probability 1 Infallibilism is that she takes this to be the formulation that better 
captures the spirit of infallibilism,4 especially when combined with an externalist view about the nature 
of evidence that attracted a lot of attention over the past two decades, and that she calls the “Sufficiency 
of Knowledge for Evidence” view (Brown, 2018: ch. 2): 
Sufficiency of Knowlegde for Evidence (SKE): if one knows that p, then p is part of one’s evidence.5  
In fact, as Brown rightly points out, SKE entails P1I. For if every proposition p that one knows goes into 
one’s “box of evidence”, then the probability of p given one’s total evidence will be trivially one insofar 
as one’s total evidence will include p itself. Given the popularity of SKE, if Probability 1 Infallibilism 
faces a skeptical challenge, then it’s worth taking it seriously.6 Crucially, according to Brown, given that 
the evidence that underwrites our propositional knowledge generally does not entail the target known 
proposition, the only way for the Infallibilist7 to avoid the sceptical threat is to endorse the following 
thesis concerning evidential-support: 
Sufficiency of Knowledge for Self-Support (SKSS): If S knows that p, then p is part of S’s evidence for p. 
 
                                                          
2 Defenders of Probability 1 Infallibilism include Williamson (2000: ch.9), Littlejohn (2008), Dodd (2011); for other 
formulations of infallibilism see Brown (2018, ch.2) and Dutant (2007). 
3See Dodd (2005) for a different argument aiming to show that Infallibilism leads to scepticism. His argument, despite 
different, retains the spirit of Brown’s objection. See Littlejohn (2008) for a rejection of Dodd’s skeptical argument. 
4 One might think, against Brown, that Probability 1 Infallibilism doesn’t really capture the spirit of infallibilist theories of 
knowledge. I think this is a very reasonable worry to have. However, for the purpose of this paper, I will grant Brown that 
Probability 1 Infallibilism is in fact the best formulation an infallibilist can come up with.  
5 Many epistemologists endorse SKE by defending the idea that p is part of one’s evidence if and only if one knows that p 
(E=K). See Williamson 2000, Hyman 2006, Littlejohn 2008, Logins 2017, Fratantonio 2018. 
6 Another reason to take this challenge seriously is that, contrary to internalist accounts of evidence, externalist theories like 
SKE are generally thought of as being the antidote to scepticism (Cf. Williamson 2000 ch. 8). 
7 From now on, when I refer to Infallibilism I am always referring to Probability 1 Infallibilism. 
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And yet, if the Infallibilist wants to successfully resist the sceptical worry by endorsing SKSS, then she 
will have to provide an explanation of what Brown calls the “Infelicity Data”, namely, the fact that it is 
infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself. (Brown, 2018, 45-7). I call this the Infelicity Challenge. 
As I will explain later, Brown anticipates two potential strategies to meet the challenge. The infallibilist 
could either question the Infelicity Data (Strategy#1), or accept the Infelicity Data while accounting for 
its plausibility in a way that is compatible with the literal truth of citing p as evidence for itself 
(Strategy#2). To defend Strategy#1, the infallibilist might appeal to the notion of self-evident 
propositions. To defend Strategy#2, she could appeal to a pragmatic explanation. Unfortunately, Brown 
argues that none of these two strategies is successful and SKSS should thus be rejected:   
“[T]here is a range of evidence which provides some reason to doubt the SKSS. First, it’s 
ordinarily infelicitous to cite a proposition as evidence for itself, even if it’s known. Second, 
in a variety of debates, such as ‘forgotten evidence’ debate, philosophers don’t seem to 
even consider the possibility that every proposition which is evidence is evidence for itself” 
(2018, 53) 
 
This paper is three-fold. The main aim of this paper is to argue that the bad reputation Probability 1 
Infallibilism has gained is undeserved: it doesn’t lead to scepticism and it is not threatened by the Infelicity 
Challenge. To do so – and this is the second aim – I will argue that the Infelicity Challenge rests on an 
ambiguity of the evidence-for relation underpinning SKSS (Section 2). In turn, having disambiguated 
between two different interpretations of the evidence-for relation will allow me to show that there are 
independent reasons why the foregoing strategies are not successful (Section 3). Third, before concluding 
the paper (in Section 5), I will briefly anticipate and resist two objections to my argument. In addressing 
and resisting the first objection, I will show that, by drawing on the two notions of evidence-for relation 
distinguished in Section 2, we can identify a different formulation of infallibilism, which, contrary to 
Probability 1 Infallibilism, seems to be threatened by a problem which looks worse than the Infelicity 
Challenge (Section 4). In addressing and resisting the second objection, I will show that, contrary to first 
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appearances, the infallibilist endorsing Probability 1 Infallibilism is not committed to any of the 
formulations of SKSS defined in Section 2. 
 
2. NO INFELICITY FOR PROBABILITY 1 INFALLIBILISM 
Following a distinction popular amongst philosophers of action as well as epistemologists, we can 
separate a justifying from a motivating role of evidence (Cf Alvarez 2010). On the one hand, one’s evidence 
plays a justifying role insofar as it is what makes a target proposition justified. On the other hand, evidence 
plays a motivating role insofar as it’s that evidence in the light of which one believes a target proposition. 8 
Given these two roles evidence can play, we can disambiguate between the following: 
Evidence-forM : a proposition e is motivating evidence for p for S iff e is the evidence in the light of 
which S believes that p. 9 
 
Evidence-forJ: a proposition e is justifying evidence for p for S iff e stands in an evidential-support 
relation towards p so as to make p justified. 
We can appreciate the distinction between Evidence-forM and Evidence-forJ by considering how they’re 
intertwined with the (evidentialist) notions of propositional and doxastic justification.10 Roughly put, 
Propositional Justification is a property of a proposition given one’s evidence, such that a proposition p is 
justified for one iff one’s evidence stands in an appropriate evidential-support relation towards p (e.g., e 
makes p sufficiently likely).11 An orthodox way of understanding Doxastic Justification in terms of 
                                                          
8 Two things worth noting here. First, Alvarez (together with most philosophers of actions that exploit the motivating-
justificatory distinction) is concerned with reasons rather than evidence. In this paper, I will assume evidence and reasons to be 
equivalent. Second, I follow Alvarez (2010) in taking a third explanatory role of evidence to come apart from its motivating 
role. 
9 I’ve left “in the light of which” intentionally vague. It could be cashed out as “S believes that p on the basis of e” or “S 
appropriately uses e as a premise for coming to believe that p”. Note that, depending on what one thinks evidence is, this will 
have different consequences. For instance, if one endorses a factive account of evidence on which if a proposition e is part of 
S’s evidence, then e is true, it follows that if one uses a false proposition q as premise in deliberation, then q will not count as 
motivating evidence. These complications, however, won’t matter for the purpose of this paper.  
10 For classic defense of evidentialism see Conee & Feldman (2004). For a classic alternative to Evidentialism about 
justification see Goldman’s Process Reliabilism (1979). 
11 Alternatively, one could define propositional justification as follows: if S were to believe that p, then S’s belief would be  
justified given one’s total evidence iff one’s evidence appropriately supports p (regardless of whether one in fact believes that 
p). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
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evidence, instead, is to take Doxastic Justification to be a property of a belief such that one’s belief that p 
is justified only if one’s belief that p is appropriately based on one’s supporting evidence. It’s in virtue of 
the justifying role of evidence that a proposition can be propositionally justified for one. It’s in virtue of 
both the justifying and motivating role that evidence plays that one’s belief that p can be doxastically justified. 
With this distinction in play, we can ask: 
i) What notion of “evidence-for” underpins the Infelicity Data? 
ii) What notion of “evidence-for” is entailed by Infallibilism? 
To answer the first question we first need to clarify what kind of infelicity is involved in the Infelicity Data. 
To do so, let’s consider Brown’s own examples: 
DETECTIVE MORSE 
“[S]uppose that in the course of his investigation into the recent burglary at the Central Jewellery 
Store, the detective Morse comes to know by eyewitness testimony that the notorious burglar, Burglar 
Bill, was in the vicinity of the Central Jewellery Store just before the theft. Suppose that we ask Morse, 
‘What evidence do you have for the claim that Burglar Bill was in the vicinity of the Central Jewellery 
Store just before the theft?’ In reply, it seems inappropriate for Morse to say, ‘Burglar Bill was in the 
vicinity of the Central Jewellery Store just before the theft. […][I]t’s in general infelicitous to reply to 
a request for evidence for p by citing p, even if p is part of one’s evidence. ’ (2018: 40, 50-51). 
 
RISK 12 
“Suppose that, in conversation, a friend asserts that I should cut down on alcohol since alcohol is a 
cancer risk. […] I ask my friend for evidence for the claim, i, that alcohol is a cancer risk. If she replies 
merely by citing i, then she is implicitly claiming that the proposition that alcohol is a cancer risk is 
evidence for the proposition that alcohol is a cancer risk. But this claim doesn’t seem to be true, but 
rather false. (Indeed, it is hard even to hear her reply as claiming that the proposition that alcohol is 
a cancer risk is evidence for that very proposition. Instead, it simply sounds like a reiteration of i 
which, in the context, constitutes a refusal to provide any evidence whatsoever for i.)” (2018: 55-56; 
2013: 629)13 
 
The foregoing cases show that it’s that distinct evidence e ≠ p that the inquirer is interested in when 
asking for evidence. After all, Brown says, in these kinds of contexts, “it’s surely clear that I am asking 
                                                          
12 Labels are mine. 
13 Brown uses this case to show that a Gricean explanation of the infelicity data is ultimately not satisfying. I will go back to 
this issue in the next Section. 
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for evidence for the relevant claim [p] rather than [p] itself” (2013: 629). The Infelicity Data as Brown 
presents it thus concerns what would constitute a felicitous reply to an evidence-request of the form: “what 
is S’s evidence for her claim that p?”. A felicitous answer to this question will be one that gives us an 
insight about the evidence S took as favouring believing p over not-believing p. For instance, as Joyce 
(2004) puts it, when we ask what evidence a judge had for finding the defendant guilty, we’re looking for 
a rationalizing explanation of the judge’s actions and beliefs. When we ask what evidence she had for her 
verdict, we’re asking something about the judge’s psychological profile: what evidence did she have that 
convinced her that the defendant was guilty? Requiring Morse to provide evidence for his belief about Burglar 
Bill’s whereabouts thus seems to presuppose the existence of evidence that guided Morse in his coming 
to believe that p. But if the phenomenon Brown wants to account for is that it’s infelicitous to cite p as 
evidence for itself to an evidence-request, then the notion of “evidence for” involved in this Infelicity 
Data is a motivating one (Evidence-forM). 
Let’s turn to the second question: what notion of “evidence-for” is entailed by Infallibilism? 
Given what said above, the Infelicity Challenge would be a real challenge for the infallibilist only if she 
had to endorse SKSS understood with Evidence-forM: 
SKSS-M: if S knows that p, then S believes that p on the basis of p. 
Crucially, Probability 1 Infallibilism remains silent on what kind of evidence one should base one’s belief 
on in order to gain knowledge. However, it is plausible to take Probability 1 Infallibilism as resting on a 
probabilistic account of evidential support, e.g., one on which e offers evidential support to p iff e makes 
p likely over a certain threshold.14 A plausible interpretation of Probability 1 Infallibilism is thus one that 
takes it to be the claim that knowledge of a proposition p requires that p offers adequate evidential 
                                                          
14 This is known as the Threshold account of evidential support (e.g., Achinstein 2001). Another popular probabilistic account 




support to p. In other words, it’s plausible to take Infallibilism to be committed to a justifying reading of 
SKSS:  
SKSS-J: If S knows that p, then p offers evidential support to p. 15 
But if this is so, then the Infelicity Challenge as Brown presents it doesn’t arise for Infallibilism. By 
moving from a claim about the evidential-support relation (what P1I and SKSS-J are concerned with), to 
a claim about what is proper to cite as evidence for a proposition p to an evidence-request (what the 
Infelicity Challenge and SKSS-M are concerned with), Brown seems to be moving from a claim about 
the justifying role of evidence to its motivating role. The problem with Brown’s Infelicity Challenge is 
that it takes something about a probabilistic relation between one’s evidence and a target proposition to 
licence a claim about what is proper or improper to cite as evidence for a proposition as a response to a 
request for evidence. Crucially, while Infallibilism can be plausibly seen as being committed to something 
about the former (e.g., because it can be understood in the light of SKSS-J), it’s silent on the latter issue. 
But, then, why should the infallibilist be expected to provide an explanation of the Infelicity Data? The 
infallibilist could grant that it’s in fact infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself in the context of evidence-
request without having to come up with any explanation of why this is the case, given this is a 
phenomenon that is not entailed by her view. 
To sum up: A plausible interpretation of Infallibilism is in terms of Evidence-forJ, and yet it’s Evidence-
forM that underpins the cases offered by Brown that give rise to the Infelicity Data. On this diagnosis, 
the Infelicity Challenge rests on an ambiguity of the notion of “evidence-for”. 
3. SELF-EVIDENCE AND PRAGMATICS 
In this section, I appeal to the distinction between Evidence-forM and Evidence-forJ to show that 
Strategy#1 and Strategy#2 are not successful for reasons that are independent of the plausibility of SKSS. 
This will help me to further corroborate my diagnosis of where Brown’s Infelicity Challenge goes wrong. 
                                                          
15 In fact, I will later show that, as defined, P1I is compatible with the rejection of SKSS-J. 
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Strategy#1: According to the first strategy, perhaps the infallibilist could just deny that it’s always 
infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself. To support this claim the infallibilist might appeal to the 
existence of a special class of propositions that are generally taken to be evidence for themselves, or “self-
evident”, e.g., self-verifying propositions and propositions about one’s experiences. Brown thinks there 
are good reasons to doubt the efficacy of this move. She argues that if self-evident propositions were a 
genuine possibility, then it’s puzzling why this option is not even considered by internalists to avoid the 
notorious “Problem of Forgotten Evidence”: 
Forgotten Evidence 
S acquires justified true belief that p at time t1 on the basis of some supporting evidence e. 
At a later time t2, S has forgotten her original evidence for p, but she retains her belief that 
p.  
 
The problem that Forgotten Evidence is supposed to raise is that, although S has forgotten her original 
evidence for p, we want to say that she’s still justified in believing that p at a later time t2. As Brown 
rightly points out, cases of forgotten evidence have traditionally been raised as a counterexample to 
internalist-evidentialists views, on which one’s justification supervenes on the evidence one has (e.g., 
Conee & Feldman, 2004). Brown’s point is the following: if there were such things as self-evident 
propositions, then how come internalists have never appealed to the notion of self-evidence to resist the 
problem of forgotten evidence? After all, if self-evident propositions were a genuine possibility, then the 
internalist could allow for S’s belief that p being justified at time t2 by saying that S’s evidence for p at t2 
is p itself. And yet, as Brown notices, “instead of attempting to argue that [S]’s justified belief that [p] is 
evidence for itself, [internalists] have attempted to identify other things which are part of [S]’s evidence 
and can support the target belief” (Brown, 2018: 53). For instance, they have cited the fact that S 
remembers coming to believe that p in a reliable way in the light of good evidence (See Conee & Feldman, 
2004; McCain, 2014).  According to Brown, the fact that no internalist has ever appealed to self-evidence 
speaks against the plausibility of self-evident propositions altogether. 
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Appealing to the distinction between Evidence-forM and Evidence-for
J allows us to see that there are 
independent reasons why evidentialist-internalists have never appealed to self-evident propositions in 
order to resist the Problem of Forgotten Evidence. Therefore, the fact that the notion of self-evidence 
is not considered in this debate cannot be used as a reason for thinking that there are no such things as 
self-evident propositions in any sense and, therefore, it cannot be used as a way to show the implausibility 
of SKSS-J and Infallibilism. 
First, note that the problem of forgotten evidence was originally raised as a challenge for an internalist-
evidentialist account of doxastic justification. To resist the problem of forgotten evidence, the evidentialist 
has to explain how S’s belief that p at time t2 “can qualify as being doxastically justified under their theory” 
(Goldman 2009, 2011: 260-61). To do so, she has to identify the evidence S’s belief that p at time t2 is 
based on. With this in mind, we can ask: if there were such things as self-evident propositions, can 
internalists resist this problem by saying that p is evidence for p?16 I believe they cannot. Given the 
distinction between Evidence-forM and Evidence-forJ, we can distinguish between the following two 
readings of Self-evidence: 
Self-EvidenceM: p is motivating self-evidence iff p is the evidence on the basis of which 
one believes that p. 
Self-EvidenceJ: p is justifying self-evidence iff p stands in an evidential-support relation 
towards p so as to make p justified. 
Perhaps the internalist could say that p is Self-evidentJ, insofar as p plausibly evidentially supports p (e.g., 
the probability of p given p (trivially) meets any given threshold required for evidential-support). 
Crucially, this won’t help the internalist. For given the Problem of Forgotten Evidence targets the 
internalist account of doxastic justification, the internalist will have to explain how S’s belief that p at t2 is 
justified. To successfully overcome the problem, the internalist cannot merely point out to an evidential 
                                                          
16 Moreover, note that Conee and Feldman explicitly endorse a view on which evidence is constituted by mental states, e.g., 
experiences. Therefore, they won’t even allow the proposition p to count as evidence. 
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relation between an instance of evidence (p) S has, and the target believed proposition (p)17. Instead, she 
has to tell us which evidence S’s belief that p at time t2 is based on. 
Would appealing to Self-EvidenceM work? Maybe the evidentialist-internalist could say that p is the 
evidence on the basis of which S believes that p, and that’s what makes S’s belief justified. This, however, 
would not be a satisfying reply. For what underpins these traditional internalist-evidentialist accounts of 
doxastic justification is exactly the assumption that there should be a logical space between a proposition 
p and the evidence on the basis of which one believes that p. As Conee and Feldman – the main defenders 
of internalism-evidentialism – say when discussing the importance of a well-founded belief in doxastic 
justification: 
“The term “well-founded” is […] used to characterize an attitude that is both well-
supported and properly arrived at [Italic is mine]. Well-foundedness is an evidentialist notion 
because its application depends on two matters of evidence – the evidence one has, and the 
evidence one uses in forming the attitude.” (Conee and Feldman 2004: 93) 
 
Appealing to Self-evidenceM would thus amount to saying that p is the evidence S uses at time t2 in 
forming the belief that p. But then, the problem with appealing to Self-EvidenceM in Forgotten Evidence 
is not that this move leads to an infelicitous claim. The problem is rather that it leads to a false claim about 
what evidence one used as basis in coming to believe that p at t2. 
Strategy#2: My diagnosis of why appealing to self-evident propositions wouldn’t be a successful move 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the second strategy Brown considers, namely, the appeal to Gricean 
pragmatics. Let’s see why. 
According to Strategy#2, in order to avoid the Infelicity Challenge, the infallibilist could insist that it’s 
literally true to cite p as evidence for p, while acknowledging that it’s infelicitous to do so. Given it would 
violate one or more Gricean conversational norms, it would be pragmatically inappropriate (Williamson, 
                                                          
17 Moreover, note that traditional evidentialists like Conee and Feldman (2004) and McCain (2014) embrace an 
“Explanationist” account of evidential support, on which e is evidence for p iff p is the best explanation for e. However, it’s 
not clear that p would thus in fact qualify as the best explanation for p itself, thereby failing to adequately stand in an evidential 
support relation towards p. More on this in the next section. 
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2000: 187-88). Crucially, according to Brown, this strategy will also fail. By inviting the reader to consider 
cases like RISK, Brown argues that there’s an important disanalogy between settings involving a request 
for evidence for p, and traditional cases in which something uttered is literally true but conversationally 
inappropriate. For in the former cases, “the problem of citing e as evidence for itself is not that this claim 
is obviously true! We struggle to see how it could be true” (2018, 54). Remember the friend’s response 
to the evidence-request in RISK: “‘alcohol is a cancer risk’ is evidence for the claim that alcohol is cancer 
risk, but I don’t mean to imply that I haven’t got any other evidence for the claim that alcohol is a cancer 
risk”. According to Brown, if we were in “Gricean pragmatics territory”, then this sentence would pass 
the so-called “Cancellation Test”, i.e., we would be able to cancel the second conjunct and be left with a 
claim that, despite inappropriate, is nevertheless true. And yet, Brown argues, the first conjunct seems 
just false rather than merely inappropriate. Hence, the pragmatic response fails. 
Once the distinction between Evidence-forM and Evidence-forJ is available, we can make sense of why 
“we struggle to see how it could be true” to cite p as evidence for p. The examples Brown considers, 
namely, those settings where “a request for evidence for p is a request for evidence for p constituted by 
propositions other than p, or ‘non-p evidence’” (55), e.g., examination settings, academic enquiry, and 
courtroom proceedings, suggest that what’s infelicitous about the Infelicity Data is the fact that in those 
settings one cites p as evidence-forM p. When we intuitively judge the truth conditions of such evidence-for 
statements in settings of enquiry, we are judging the truth conditions of statements about the evidence 
that convinced S to believe that p. This explains why the Cancellation Test doesn’t work in cases involving 
evidence-for statements: the first conjunct is in fact false and not merely inappropriate, given it’s false 
that S used the fact that alcohol is cancer risk as evidence for coming to believe that alcohol is a cancer 
risk. After all, Brown describes DETECTIVE MORSE as a case in which “the detective Morse comes 
to know by eyewitness testimony that […] Burglar Bill was in the vicinity of the Central Jewellery Store just 
before the theft.” (italics are mine). 
12 
 
Where does this leave us? In the previous section, I have argued that the Infelicity Challenge rests on an 
ambiguity of the notion of the evidence-for relation. On the one hand, it is plausible to take Infallibilism 
as a claim about evidential support. This means that all the infallibilist has to do to avoid scepticism is to 
endorse SKSS-J, and yet it is SKSS-M that underpins the Infelicity Data. In this Section, I have shown 
that by appealing to the Evidence-forM/Evidence-forJ distinction, and the corresponding SKSS-
M/SKSS-J, we can see that Strategy#1 and Strategy#2 fail for reasons that are independent of 
Infallibilism. Therefore, the failure of these strategies cannot be used, as Brown does, as an indication of 
the implausibility of infallibilism and, more precisely, of SKSS-J. 
4. OBJECTIONS 
Before concluding this paper, I want to briefly address and resist two objections to my argument. 
Objection#1: “Given the defender of Infallibilism wants to give an account of knowledge, she is also 
interested in doxastic justification. Therefore, infallibilism doesn’t merely involve the justifying 
understanding of the evidence-for relation, but its motivating understanding as well. If she wants to avoid 
scepticism she will also have to endorse SKSS-M.” 18 
Response: First, note that Probability 1 Infallibilism merely gives us a necessary condition for knowledge. 
By doing so, it leaves it open how we should understand other necessary conditions on knowledge, e.g., 
doxastic justification. Probability 1 Infallibilism is compatible with the orthodox account of doxastic 
justification, one on which one’s belief that p is doxastically justified only if one believes that p on the 
basis of one’s propositional justification for p, but it’s also compatible with a Knowledge-first account of 
doxastic justification, one on which one’s belief that p is doxastically justified iff one knows that p (e.g., 
Sutton 2005, Williamson forthcoming). In fact, Infallibilism is compatible with the orthodox view on 
which knowledge entails doxastic justification, as well as with less orthodox views on which knowledge 
doesn’t require justification (e.g., Foley 1987). Even if we grant that the Infallibilist is also concerned with 
                                                          
18 Thanks to Jessica Brown for raising this objection to me in conversation. 
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doxastic justification, signing up to Probability 1 Infallibilism doesn’t force the Infallibilist to embrace 
SKSS-M or any specific account of doxastic justification. However, the discussion in the previous section 
allows us to identify another version of infallibilism that we should expect to be problematic:  
Motivating Infallibilism (MI): If S knows that p, then there is a proposition e, such that S believes that 
p on the basis of e and P(p|e) =119 
If the defender of MI wants to avoid scepticism, then she has to embrace SKSS-M: If S knows that p, 
then p is the evidence on the basis of which S knows that p. But what the above discussion teaches us is 
that paradigmatic cases of knowledge based on evidence are cases in which the evidence e that works as 
rational basis for believing (and knowing) that p is such that p ≠ e. Interestingly, MI faces a problem that 
is even more serious than the one allegedly posed by Brown’s Infelicity Challenge. If we assume anti-
scepticism, Motivating Infallibilism doesn’t merely entail an infelicitous claim, but it entails a false claim 
about what constitutes one’s rational basis in coming to believe and know that p. However, given what I 
have said above, it is clear that Probability 1 Infallibilism does not entail Motivating Infallibilism. As 
things stand, these challenges do not threat Probability 1 Infallibilism. 
Objection#2: “Even if we grant that Infallibilism entails SKSS-J (and not SKSS-M), the claim that p is 
evidence for itself in a justifying sense is equally infelicitous. Imagine that I explicitly ask the judge what 
justifying evidence there is for Smith being the murderer. It would be very weird if the judge responded 
that ‘Smith being the murderer’ is evidence for ‘Smith being the murderer’”.20 
Response: Once we interpret Probability 1 Infallibilism as a claim concerning evidential support and 
propositional justification, and once we appreciate the fact that propositional justification is merely about 
the logical relation between one’s evidence and a target proposition p, I suspect the infallibilist will have 
few qualms in insisting that there’s nothing infelicitous in saying that a proposition p is propositionally 
justified by itself. For this would amount to saying that p is trivially logically entailed by itself, or that the 
                                                          
19 I believe that an evidentialist formulation of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism would be committed to MI (cf 
Pritchard 2012). Discussing Epistemological Disjunctivism would lead us too far afield. 
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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probability of p given p is 1. However, I imagine some readers won’t be entirely satisfied with this 
response. Fortunately, the Infallibilist who is not willing to give up on his view but who also wants to 
side-step the justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge can do so. For, on closer inspection, we can 
see that not only is Infallibilism not committed to SKSS-M, but, despite first appearances, it is not 
committed to SKSS-J either. To see why this is the case, let’s recall what variety of infallibilism Brown is 
considering: 
Probability 1 Infallibilism: If S knows that p, then the probability of p given one’s total evidence E is 1 
As mentioned in the previous section, it is plausible to take Probability 1 Infallibilism to be about what 
kind of propositional justification (and evidential support) knowledge requires. In particular, it is plausible 
to take Infallibilism to be a claim that rests on a probabilistic account of evidential support, e.g., one on 
which one’s total evidence E supports p iff E makes p sufficiently likely. However, this is not something 
that a defender of Probability 1 Infallibilism has to do. Note that, as Brown herself explicitly points out, 
one of the reasons we should take the Infelicity Challenge for P1I seriously is that P1I is entailed by a 
popular contemporary view about evidence, i.e., SKE: the thesis that if one knows that p, then p is part 
of one’s evidence. Crucially, SKE is a claim about the nature of evidence, and it is by itself completely 
silent on what it means for evidence to support a proposition. That is, it is silent on how to spell out the 
evidential-support relation. And yet, the version of the Infelicity Challenge that (allegedly) still arises for 
Infallibilism rests on the idea that Infallibilism is committed to SKSS-J: if one knows that p, then p is 
part of S’s (justifying) evidence for p. In particular, for the argument to work, it is crucial that we 
understand “p is part of S’s evidence for p” correctly. For the argument against Infallibilism will be 
effective if and only if Infallibilism is committed to the idea that if one knows that p, then p provides 
adequate evidential support to p so as to make p propositionally justified. But once we understand that 
SKE is what generates P1I, we can see that the Infallibilist can hold both SKE and P1I, while endorsing 
an alternative non-probabilistic account of evidential support, one which doesn’t give rise to the Infelicity 
Challenge. For instance, one could adopt SKE (and thus P1I), while endorsing an Explanationist account 
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of evidential support, one on which e is (justifying) evidence for a proposition p iff p is the best 
explanation for e (e.g., McCain 2013). Insofar as what counts as best explanation will depend on various 
factors, such as, simplicity, explanatory power and fruitfulness, it is plausible to say that p will not 
constitute the best explanation for p. But then it looks like P1I does not entail SKSS-J after all. Why does 
this matter? It matters because this puts the infallibilist in a position to explain why citing the proposition 
“Smith is the murderer” as evidence for the proposition “Smith is the murder” is not merely infelicitous, 
but false even on an Infallibilist account. For while the proposition “Smith is the murderer” will be part 
of the judge’s evidence as soon as she comes to know that Smith is the murder (as entailed by SKE), the 
evidence “Smith is the murderer” is not evidence for the proposition “Smith is the murderer”, for this 
fails to be the best explanation of why the proposition is true in the first place. 
Another option available to the the defender of SKE and P1I is to avoid SKSS-J by endorsing a version 
of pragmatic or moral encroachment. That is, one could say that whether evidence e offers adequate 
evidential support for a proposition p depends on the practical or moral stakes involved in a specific 
context (cf. e.g., Moss 2018, Basu 2019).21 What this shows, once again, is that SKE and P1I are claims 
about the nature of evidence, while SKSS-J underpinning the justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge 
is a claim about what it takes for evidence to support a proposition. 
Let us recapitulate. I have pointed out i) that P1I is a consequence of SKE, and ii) that SKE is a claim 
about the nature of evidence, thereby remaining neutral on what it means for an instance of evidence e to 
support a proposition p. Crucially, the justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge is supposed to arise 
for P1I only if P1I entails SKSS-J: if S knows that p, then p is justifying evidence for p. But once we 
realise that P1I merely states a necessary condition for knowledge, the infallibilist can endorse a non-
probabilistic account of evidential support, e.g., an Explanationist account, without having to commit 
                                                          
21 Alternatively, one can say that the infallibilist can endorse SKE (and thus P1I) together with the view on which 
moral/pragmatic factors encroach on the standards required for knowledge. 
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itself to the further claim that p is (justifying) evidence for itself. In other words: P1I does not by itself 
entail SKSS-J. Therefore, the justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge doesn’t arise. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I’ve argued that the Infelicity Challenge for infallibilism rests on an ambiguity of what it 
means for evidence e to be evidence for a proposition p. On the one hand, the Infelicity Challenge has 
been presented as the challenge of explaining the Infelicity Data, namely, that it’s infelicitous to cite p as 
evidence for itself. However, the plausibility of the Infelicity Data rests on a motivating reading of the 
“evidence-for” relation. On the other hand, the thesis allegedly entailed by the infallibilist, namely, that if 
one knows that p then p is evidence for itself, is one that might be thought of as involving a justifying 
notion of “evidence-for”. Putting things in terms of justification, while it’s plausible to think of 
Infallibilism as saying something about propositional justification, it surely doesn’t entail any specific 
account of doxastic justification. Moreover, I have shown that, although it’s plausible to read Infallibilism 
as entailing something about propositional justification, as it is defined, it is actually silent on how to 
understand the evidential-support relation (and thus propositional justification). Therefore, even if one 
insisted that there is another justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge the Infallibilist has to resist, the 
Infallibilist can do so. For the justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge arises only if the infallibilist is 
committed to a probabilistic account of evidential support, one which entails SKSS-J: if S knows that p, 
then p is part of S’s justifying evidence for p. However, I have shown that Infallibilism, as defined, is 
perfectly compatible with other accounts of evidential-support, such as, the Explanationist account, 
which instead does not entail SKSS-J. 
The conclusion we can draw is that, once it’s clear that the Infelicity Data is about evidence-forM, the 
Infallibilist can: accept the data, say that it’s not literally true to cite p as evidence-forM p, while i) either 
insisting that it’s literally true to say that p is evidence-forJ p (if they want to retain a probabilistic account 
of evidential support on pain of facing a justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge), or ii) insisting that 
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it is also not literally true to cite p as evidence-forJ p (e.g., if they endorse a non-probabilistic account of 
evidential-support, thereby resisting the justifying version of the Infelicity Challenge). 
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